Britain after Brexit: a transformed political landscape by Applebaum, Anne
  
Anne Applebaum 
Britain after Brexit: a transformed political 
landscape 
 
Article (Published version) 
(Refereed) 
 
 
 
 
Original citation: 
Applebaum, Anne (2017) Britain after Brexit: a transformed political landscape. Journal of 
Democracy, 28 (1). pp. 53-58. ISSN 1045-573 
 
© 2017 National Endowment for Democracy and Johns Hopkins University Press 
 
This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/69178/ 
 
Available in LSE Research Online: February 2017 
 
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the School. 
Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual authors 
and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any article(s) in LSE 
Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. You may not 
engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities or any 
commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE Research 
Online website.  
A TrAnsformed 
PoliTicAl lAndscAPe
Anne Applebaum
Anne Applebaum is a columnist for the Washington Post and Profes-
sor of Practice at the London School of Economics. She is the author 
of several books, including Gulag: A History, which won the 2004 
Pulitzer Prize for nonfiction, and Iron Curtain, which won the 2013 
Cundill Prize for Historical Literature.
In January 2013, British prime minister David Cameron, confronted by 
growing support for the far-right U.K. Independence Party (UKIP) and 
by a rebellious Euroskeptic wing within his own Conservative party, 
pledged to hold a referendum on the United Kingdom’s membership in 
the European Union. By all accounts, Cameron never expected that such 
a vote would actually be held. Rather, he considered the promise of a 
referendum as a way to appease Euroskeptics within Conservative ranks 
and to hold his fractured party together until the May 2015 general elec-
tions which Cameron was widely expected to lose. 
But Cameron won the elections, and he had to make good on his 
promise to hold an up-or-down vote on Britain’s EU membership: Leave 
versus Remain. Cameron campaigned on behalf of Remain, but to the 
surprise of pollsters—and indeed the prime minister himself—the citi-
zens of the U.K. on 23 June 2016 voted by 52 to 48 percent in favor of 
Leave. Cameron resigned as prime minister the next day. But instead of 
resolving his party’s problems, the referendum has exacerbated them. 
Though it is not yet clear that all of their leaders understand this, both 
the Conservative Party and the Labour Party are now in deep crisis—and 
so is British democracy. 
In fact, the weakening of the British party structure goes back many 
years and has little to do with the EU. Nor is this trend unique to the 
United Kingdom. All across Europe, and indeed all across the democrat-
ic world, power has been draining from national governments. “Win-
ning an election may still be one of life’s great thrills, but the afterglow 
is diminishing,” Moises Naím wrote in his 2013 book The End of Power, 
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and he is right. Western politicians of all kinds now complain that they 
have far less influence and control than their predecessors did. 
The effects of globalization have been felt with special force in the 
U.K., which has one of the most internationally integrated economies in 
the world. The spread of free trade means that decisions that affect people 
in Britain may well be made in China, Texas, or Bahrain. The growth in 
international wealth, especially in the developing world, means that fashion 
trends in Asia can shape manufacturing decisions in Britain. At the same 
time, the breakup of empires—the British empire, the French empire, the 
Soviet empire—over the past century means that New Delhi can now affect 
London just as much as London affects New Delhi. The growth in asym-
metric warfare has given tiny terrorist movements a degree of international 
influence that conventional military powers such as the U.K. cannot match. 
The spread of ideas through the Internet and Hollywood movies leaves 
all politicians with fewer opportunities to reach their constituents, let 
alone to help shape popular culture. Above all, the rise in the power of 
financial markets means that governments have far less leeway than they 
once had in making economic decisions and in shaping the business cli-
mates in their own countries. On Black Wednesday in September 1992, 
the U.K. government was forced to drop out of the European Exchange 
Rate Mechanism by the combined efforts of hedge funds. More recent-
ly, the Greek government has found that it is unable to pump up public 
spending as it wishes, because financial markets will not tolerate it.
The EU’s Ambiguous Role
In each of these spheres—political, cultural, and financial—the Eu-
ropean Union played an ambiguous role: It imposed some constraints 
upon U.K. politicians, but also expanded their power in other areas by 
giving Britain a role in shaping the decisions of European leaders. But 
because the EU was regarded as a “foreign” institution, always treated 
warily by British politicians and journalists, it became the scapegoat for 
the broader changes that have genuinely undermined the power not only 
of the British state, but of most other states as well. 
The impact of these changes on domestic politics has been profound. 
Above all, the changing nature of global economics and culture has nar-
rowed the ideological range of British politics. In the 1990s, the Labour 
Party abandoned socialism for a watered-down version of free-market eco-
nomics, not because it wanted to do so, but because Tony Blair recognized 
that socialism had ceased to be a real option in a world where so much 
of policy is dictated by international markets. In the 2000s, David Cam-
eron abandoned a “small-c” conservative vision of Britain, dropping his 
party’s opposition to gay marriage and promoting “green” causes, among 
other things. Many Tories disliked these changes, but again, cultural shifts 
that seemed to be beyond their control forced them into acceptance. 
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Yet when both parties shifted to the center, dissatisfied groups pro-
liferated on the fringes. The Labour Party acquired an angry far-left 
caucus that schemed to take over the leadership. It finally did so in 2015, 
aided by reforms to the party’s internal electoral rules that were ushered 
in the year before. The reform did away with the party’s tripartite elec-
toral-college system, which gave one-third of the vote each to Labour 
members of the House of Commons and the European Parliament (EP); 
to trade unions; and to individual party members. The old formula was 
replaced by a “one member, one vote” system that restricts votes to indi-
vidual party members and weights their votes equally. By virtue of this 
change, left-wing protest candidate Jeremy Corbyn was elected party 
leader with an unprecedented 59.5 percent of the vote, despite having 
won the support of only 20 of his 220 Labour colleagues in the House of 
Commons. Meanwhile, elements within the Tory party that had accepted 
Cameron’s changes as unfortunate necessities (but went on disliking 
them) inflamed intraparty divisions, and some of them went so far as to 
defect to the UKIP. Though there are many obvious differences between 
these “far-left” and “far-right” groups, it is important to note that both 
tend to oppose some of the same things: centrist politics, global trade, 
immigration, and the European Union. 
Three other factors specific to the United Kingdom also helped to 
draw power away from Parliament and away from the traditional parties. 
The first was the devolution of U.K. politics under the previous Labour 
governments, which created new centers of power in Wales, Northern 
Ireland, and above all Scotland. The growth of the Scottish National 
Party (SNP) was made possible by the rise in influence of the Scottish 
Parliament, in which the SNP is the largest party. But the SNP also took 
advantage of Scottish dissatisfaction with the centrist direction of the 
British Labour Party, taking enough votes from Labour to deprive it of 
the prospect of a U.K. electoral majority for the foreseeable future. 
A second factor was the transformation of Britain’s EP elections into 
“protest votes.” In part because British media, unlike some of their Conti-
nental counterparts, never took EP elections seriously, and in part because 
turnout numbers were low, British voters felt comfortable sending fringe 
parties to the European Parliament. Even the extreme-rightist British Na-
tional Party (BNP) won 6.3 percent and 2 seats in 2009, helping to bring 
many of that party’s anti-immigration views into the U.K. mainstream, 
though the party failed to win any seats in 2014. The UKIP, by contrast, 
greatly improved its performance in the 2014 EP elections, finishing first 
among U.K. parties with 27.5 percent of the vote and 24 seats (up from 
16.5 percent and 13 seats in 2009). The rise of the UKIP was significantly 
aided by the budgets, platforms, and institutional support that its elected 
representatives received from the European Parliament. 
The third factor, harder to quantify, is the role of London as an in-
ternational financial capital—perhaps the world’s most important. The 
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success of the City of London has brought billions of pounds in taxes to 
the U.K. treasury. But the same success has also attracted immigrants, 
from the very wealthy (who drove up property prices, making it dif-
ficult for British people to live in London) to workers, mostly in the 
service industries, from all over the world. For British citizens who did 
not live there, London came to have a “foreign” aspect, deepening their 
sense that the metropolitan “elite” residing in the capital was somehow 
alienated from the rest of the country. The fact that both Tony Blair and 
David Cameron were perceived as close to the City and its money may 
have had a significantly negative impact on the way they were perceived 
by centrist Labourites and centrist Tories outside the capital.  
The Referendum Exacerbates the Crisis
Cameron’s referendum was designed to defeat the UKIP, as well as 
the “far-right” wing of the Tories, and to reestablish his camp of “mod-
ernizers” as the dominant force in the party. But his effort backfired. 
Several leading Conservatives seen as centrist politicians—most notably 
Boris Johnson, the popular two-term mayor of London—joined the anti-
EU side, giving a comforting mainstream gloss to the Leave campaign. 
So did some influential media, notably the Daily Telegraph and Daily 
Mail, newspapers that are not regarded as “extreme” by their readers. At 
the same time, the Labour Party under Corbyn’s leadership barely cam-
paigned, putting few resources and no enthusiasm into the Remain cam-
paign. Afterwards, Corbyn even refused to say how he himself had voted. 
But the narrow referendum victory of the anti-EU forces has left the 
U.K. party structure more skewed than ever. The Tory party is now dedi-
cated to the Leave agenda. The modernizers are out, and the Euroskeptic 
and culturally conservative “right” has gained more influence than ever 
before. Meanwhile, the Labour party is still dominated by the Euro-
skeptic and anti–free trade “left.” That leaves a very large part of the 
population—including most of those who voted Remain—essentially 
unrepresented by either of Parliament’s two leading parties. 
The referendum also delivered yet another blow to parliamentary de-
mocracy, further draining power from elected representatives. Given a 
free vote, a majority of MPs would choose to have the U.K. remain 
within the EU. But the referendum has ensured that they do not have a 
voice, and are in effect disenfranchised from the most momentous set 
of British political decisions since the Second World War. It is unclear 
how Parliament will now be able to shape changes in Britain’s trading 
relationships or its new foreign-policy arrangements.
Assuming that the referendum does in fact result in Britain’s de-
finitively leaving the European Union, it will have a mixed impact on 
Parliament. On the one hand, once Britain is outside the EU, one will 
certainly be able to claim that Parliament has more control over a wide 
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range of issues and policies inside the country. On the other hand, the 
first few years after Brexit is officially announced will be partly spent 
filling the gaps left behind by the departing EU. Just for a start, there 
will be demands to replace agricultural and structural subsidies as well 
as billions of dollars in research funding. Failure to meet those demands 
could further alienate British citizens from their government. 
Post-Brexit British governments will also be expected to fulfill prom-
ises made during the referendum campaign. Many British voters thought 
that they were voting to end immigration, failing to realize that at least 
half the immigrants who come to the U.K. every year—those from South 
Asia, Africa, and the Caribbean—are not affected by EU laws. It also 
will be difficult to reduce the number of Europeans living in the U.K. 
unless there is a program to expel them—and unless the U.K. is prepared 
to countenance similar expulsions of its own citizens from the Conti-
nent. Many British voters also believed that by favoring Brexit they 
were voting for greater spending on the National Health Service and the 
rest of the British welfare state. These voters may become even more 
dissatisfied when they discover that Brexit will not, in fact, provide any-
thing close to the additional £350 million per week for the British bud-
get that some Leave campaigners had claimed it would. 
Finally, exiting the EU will leave British politicians with less influ-
ence and less impact on the rest of the world. Unless they are able to 
negotiate a closer relationship with the EU, they will no longer help to 
shape its foreign and trade policy; its regulations; or its decisions on 
justice, security, and borders. They will not be represented by MEPs 
in the European parliament, and they will not be present at meetings of 
the European Council, where Europe’s heads of government make joint 
decisions on a huge range of issues. Though it may take several years for 
the impact of this change to be felt, the end result will be a deepening of 
the sense that Westminster “doesn’t matter.” 
There is a strong risk that, in order to compensate, Britain may drift 
farther away from the other democracies of the West. New trade officials 
will be eager to make quick deals with China, and these may require po-
litical concessions. Russian, Kazakh, and Arab money will matter more 
in London as European partners drift away, raising the risk that the U.K. 
financial system will become more dependent on foreign companies and 
partners who seek political influence in exchange for deals. The British 
political system is already heavily influenced by the foreign and off-
shore cash that now flows through London. Groups such as Conserva-
tive Friends of Russia and Conservative Friends of the Chinese, both of 
which have many prominent parliamentarians as members, openly lobby 
on behalf of those countries inside the U.K. political system.
Attempts to rethink or to reimagine British political parties, and in par-
ticular to soften the divide between the Tories and Labour, have a long his-
tory. This goes back to the creation of the Social Democratic Party (SDP) by 
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centrist defectors from the Labour Party in 1981. This new party formed a 
political and electoral alliance with the remnant of the historic Liberal Party, 
which had governed Britain for much of the nineteenth and early-twentieth 
centuries before Labour displaced it as the chief rival to the Tories. The SDP-
Liberal Alliance won 25 percent of the vote but only 23 seats in Parliament in 
the 1983 elections, and its totals slipped to 23 percent and 22 seats in 1987. 
The two parties formally merged in 1988, adopting the following year 
the label of Liberal Democrats. Although they never quite reached the 
quarter of the vote achieved by the SDP-Liberal Alliance in 1983, the 
Liberal Democrats were able to win a greater number of seats—a high 
of 62 in 2005, and 57 in 2010. In the latter year, under the leadership of 
Nick Clegg, the Liberal Democrats made the decision to join the Tories 
as junior partners in a coalition government. This move, however, un-
dermined their own standing, and in the 2015 elections they were able 
to retain only eight seats, as the Conservatives won an outright majority. 
These efforts to recast the British political debate and to create an attrac-
tive centrist option had some temporary successes, but they all ultimately 
failed. Under Britain’s first-past-the-post electoral system, none was able to 
draw enough votes from the two leading parties parties to gain real power. 
Right now, several groups are seeking to find ways of launching new 
political parties, or at least political movements, that can recapture the 
center and restore popular trust in politics and politicians. In due course, 
they may be able to reorient British politics around the issues that people 
care most about, rather than around old “right-left” divisions that no 
longer mean very much. 
Finally, it is critically important that the British government under-
stand that we are entering an era of vitally important foreign-policy de-
cisions. It does not matter what the Leave campaign believed in advance 
of the vote: The international perception, correct or otherwise, is of a 
U.K. that has turned in on itself and is disengaged from the outside 
world. The British government should bend over backward to correct 
that perception. The U.K. should increase its support for NATO and its 
military commitment to Europe, and find new ways of connecting politi-
cally and economically with the Continent. 
To preserve its independence, the U.K. also needs to push back 
against money laundering, whether through the U.K.’s extensive off-
shore connections or through its property market. The British govern-
ment needs to recommit itself to supporting and promoting democracy 
and free markets all around the world. A free and democratic Britain 
will not thrive in a world where others have put up trade barriers and 
blocked political and intellectual freedom. Countries that do not export 
and promote their own values usually find that, sooner or later, they 
are living in accordance with the values of somebody else. A retreating 
Britain will be a weaker Britain, with profound and unpleasant conse-
quences for everyone who lives in the British Isles. 
